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The article explores the United Nations approach to peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau following 
the 1998-1999 armed conflict in the country. Despite efforts from the United Nations and 
other international actors, the country seems still far from achieving the sustainable peace 
advocated by intervenors. The main hypothesis herein sustained is that this limitation is due to 
the strong basis of the UN approach on the liberal peace framework. This framework is 
particularly marked by the (usually top-down) promotion of fundamentally liberal values and 
practices to post-armed conflict situations. It is thus argued that the limitations of the UN 
approach to peacebuilding are to be found not only in the implementation or 
operationalization of specific policies, but also in their own design. 




The United Nations (UN) has been involved in the peacebuilding process in Guinea-Bissau 
since the late 1990s. Following the armed conflict and the deployment of a peacekeeping 
operation by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the UN established 
a political office in Bissau to ensure the continuity of the ceasefire. More recently, in 
addition to transforming this political presence into an integrated office,  the UN included 
Guinea-Bissau in the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), an intergovernmental 
advisory body created in 2005 to provide greater coherence and coordination to the efforts 
of the various actors involved in peacebuilding processes worldwide.
1
  
Despite the efforts of the United Nations and other global actors, the situation in Guinea-
Bissau remains fragile and the prospects for improvement seem limited. The years following 
the 1998-1999 armed conflict have been marked by constant fragility and weakness in the 
political, institutional and socio-economic structures of the country (Kabia, 2009; Roque, 
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1
 On the creation of the PBC, see in particular Jenkins (2013), Bellamy (2010) and Neves (2009). 
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2009; ICG, 2008). Those weaknesses may be illustrated, for example, by the dissolution of 
parliament by the head of the executive in 2003 and the assassination of former President 
João Ber ardo Ni o  Vieira in 2009. The country continues to have low human 
development indicators and currently ranks 176 (out of 186 countries) in the latest Human 
Development Report produced by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 
Furthermore, other socio-economic indicators usually place the former Portuguese colony 
below the average for West African countries: approximately 49% of the population live on 
less than 1.25 dollars per day (UNDP, 2011), the literacy rate for adults is only 54% and the 
gross national income per capita is 1.042 dollars (UNDP, 2013).  
Against this backdrop, this article aims to demonstrate that the United Nations approach 
to peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau has been particularly limited by its strong adherence to 
the liberal peace paradigm. This approach, as demonstrated by a now vast line of research, is 
essentially characterised by the promotion of liberal norms, practices and values, especially 
those associated with democracy and the market economy (vide, e.g., Richmond, 2005, 
2011; Roberts, 2011; Pugh et al., 2008; Duffield, 2007; Paris, 2004). Peacebuilding efforts, 
when based on the liberal peace tenets, are usually characterised by programmes, practices 
and actions implemented from the top-down in areas that are not necessarily defined as 
priorities by local populations or that respond to the root causes of armed conflicts. 
Consequently, despite occasional progress in some areas (particularly security), 
peacebuilding processes based on the liberal peace paradigm rarely succeed in creating the 
necessary conditions for the emergence of a sustainable peace guided by a genuine (rather 
than virtual) social contract, as would be expected in a liberal democratic society (Richmond, 
2011).  
The proposed analysis does not intend to examine the causes and consequences of the 
armed conflict that devastated Guinea-Bissau in the late 1990s, nor assess the impact of UN 
efforts in the country. On the contrary, this article takes a step back,  focusing on the actual 
peacebuilding policies and instruments formulated in New York. The basic assumptions 
underlying the liberal peace are reflected in these policies and instruments, especially in the 
emphasis they place on the markedly liberal conceptions and worldviews found in their 
guidelines, priorities and objectives. These conceptions and worldviews necessarily influence 
the implementation and operationalisation of peacebuilding programmes and projects in the 
field by UN agencies and other international actors. As such, it is argued that the weakness 
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of the UN approach to peacebuilding processes lies not only in the implementation or in the 
operationalisation of specific policies and projects, but also in their actual conceptualisation 
and formulation. 
The following section outlines the basis for this argument, focusing on the theoretical-
political framework of the liberal peace that underpins the United Nations  o ept a d 
practices of peacebuilding. The second section then provides an overview of the UN 
peacebuilding efforts in Guinea-Bissau. It should be noted that this section does not examine 
the armed conflict in Guinea-Bissau or its consequences exhaustively, but only to the extent 
necessary to contextualise the UN peacebuilding approach and policies formulated for the 
country. The third section identifies the extent to which those efforts reflect, albeit 
implicitly, the principles of the liberal peace paradigm. The final section presents some 
considerations by way of a conclusion. The analysis is based primarily on the interpretation 
of official and unofficial primary sources, including internal documents and interviews held 
with UN and Member State officials who have been directly involved in the dynamics herein 
analysed.  
 
The United Nations concept and practice of peacebuilding 
According to a recent line of academic research, the UN concept and practice of 
peacebuilding have been primarily influenced by a sophisticated theoretical-political 
framework, namely the liberal peace (see, amongst many others, Richmond, 2005, 2011; 
Chandler, 2010; Pugh et al., 2008; Duffield, 2007; Mac Ginty, 2006; Paris, 2004). According to 
Oliver Richmond, one of the leading theoreticians in this line of research, the liberal peace 
presents itself as a dis ourse, framework and structure  ‘i h o d, :  that 
embodies a long, essentially western, tradition of experiences in armed conflicts and 
thinking about peace. At the core of this framework lies the belief in a simplified version of 
the democratic peace  hypothesis, which states that democracies rarely wage war against 
each other (see Russett, 1993; Doyle, 1983a; 1983b). The democratic peace  hypothesis 
should not, however, be confused with the li eral peace  framework, since the latter, more 
than a theory about the apparent absence of wars between democracies (i.e. the democratic 
peace), involves the proactive articulation of the promotion of liberal values and practices in 
the political, economic, security and social realms as the remedy for the consequences of 
armed conflicts. The liberal peace thus focuses not just on domestic political institutions 
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and their international implications, but on the character of peace in civil and societal, 
political, economic, security, and international spheres  ‘i h o d, : . 
Theorisations about the influence of the liberal peace on peacebuilding practices 
stemmed from an academic critique whose objective is to highlight and move beyond the 
failures and limitations inherently associated with the external, often top-down, promotion 
of (usually western) systems of democratic governance and free market economies. 
Richmond (2005: in particular 202-214) underscores the western influence in these efforts 
when discussing the four strands of thought or discourse about peace that constitute the 
liberal peace. The first is the i tor s pea e, a limited and short-lived form of peace 
essentially associated with the use of military force, normally by hegemonic powers. The 
next two strands of thought are heavily influenced by the Western European Enlightenment 
project: the constitutional peace, which reflects the defence, particularly along the lines of 
the first pacifist movements, of ideas such as cosmopolitism, disarmament, democracy, free 
trade and humanitarian law; and the institutional peace, based on legal norms and on 
regulation by international institutions. Finally, the fourth strand of thought or discourse 
constituting the liberal peace is the civil peace, which is strongly defined by humanitarianism 
and focuses on social actors and movements (ibidem). The balance between these four 
strands produces the liberal peace and, at the same time, reflects its aspirations for 
freedom and mutual regulation  ‘i h o d and Franks, 2009: 5).  
According to this view, the democratic peace envisaged is assumed as universal and 
achievable as long as ertai  pea eful  methods and techniques are efficiently 
implemented. The general agreement on the means and techniques, as well as on the 
purposes and objectives of peacebuilding, would then lead to a o se sus  a o gst the 
main global actors on the idea and practice of peacebuilding. Among the techniques, 
methods and technologies agreed by those actors, one finds conflict prevention, mediation, 
peacekeeping and peacemaking, humanitarian aid and conflict resolution (Richmond, 2004). 
The generalised consensus on these methods thus reflects a discourse and practices that 
project peacebuilding as the construction of liberal democracy, with a free market and 
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In general, such methods and technologies were developed from various generations of 
approaches to armed conflict management and resolution  (Richmond, 2005: 85-123). In the 
United Nations, the 1992 Report of the Secretary-General entitled An Agenda for Peace  is 
a milestone in this process. In this document, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, 
peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding were described as mechanisms or techniques 
available to UN activities in the field of international peace and security. They were thus 
defined vis-à-vis a sequential and linear reading of armed conflicts in which preventive 
diplomacy would be used before the outbreak of direct violence, peacemaking and 
peacekeeping after the cessation of hostilities, and post-conflict peacebuilding, obviously, 
after the termination of the armed conflict (A/47/277-S/24111: paragraph 20-21). 
Produced in the period immediately after the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, the document brought the strong influence of the liberal peace to bear on 
the concept of peacebuilding. In fact, the author of the report explicitly assumed a direct and 
unequivocal relationship between the promotion of democracies and peace, stating that 
[t]here is an obvious connection between democratic practices – such as the rule of law and 
transparency in decision-making – and the achievement of true peace and security in any 
new and stable political order  (A/47/277-S/24111: paragraph 59). Other aspects of the 
liberal peace, especially those associated with its external, top-down promotion, may be 
found in other UN documents, including the most recent conceptual basis  produced by the 
Policy Committee of the Secretary-General
3
 in 2007. The basis, which should, in theory, be 
adopted throughout the UN system, reflects this conception, although in a subtle and 
complex manner:  
Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing 
into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to 
lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be 
coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national 
ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively 
narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives. (United Nations, 2007: 1) 
                                                 
2
 Despite the different conceptio s of de o ra ,  it is important to stress that in the UN context visions of 
de o ra  ha e al a s ee  asso iated ith the ester  li eral traditio . For a  i -depth analysis, see 
Haack (2011). 
3
 The Committee is the highest decision-making body within the Secretariat. It is chaired by the Secretary-
General and composed of the heads of some of the most influential UN organizational structures. 
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The influence of liberal peace, however, is not restricted to conceptual formulations. On 
the contrary, in activities effectively undertaken in conflict or post-armed conflict contexts 
since the end of the Cold War, the main global actors gradually began to operate in 
accordance with a shared horizon for the promotion of liberal values and practices. In fact, in 
spite of the differences identified among the several peacebuilding initiatives carried out by 
the UN since the 1990s, its peace operations have normally promoted free and fair 
elections, the construction of democratic political institutions, respect for civil liberties, and 
market-oriented economic reforms  Paris, : . 
Concretely, peacebuilding efforts based on the liberal peace project have implied the 
following, amongst other measures: provision of technical assistance to national 
governments with a view to, for example, identifying specific needs and priorities; support to 
the promotion of democratic values and practices and human rights; direct or indirect 
support to processes of security sector reform; and support to national reconciliation 
processes and poverty reduction initiatives.
4
 Many of these tasks gradually began to be 
carried out as part of UN peacekeeping operations from the late 1980s onwards, although 
they were not usually classified or defined under the heading of peacebuilding at the time. 
However, at the core of these activities, there was always the underlying idea that certain 
kinds of (liberally constituted) societies will tend to be more peaceful, both in their domestic 
affairs and in their international relations, than illiberal states are  (Newman et al., 2009: 
11). 
Conceived along these lines, the liberal peace is understood as a top-down approach that 
too often ignores or neglects the everyday needs and socio-economic realities found in the 
specific contexts of armed conflicts. Consequently, although sometimes succeeding in 
obtaining results such as a short-term reduction of violence, interventions guided by the 
liberal peace paradigm frequently fail to provide the conditions required to achieve 
sustainable peace, usually discouraging the emergence of a genuine social contract between 
the population at hand and the state which represents them (Richmond, 2011: 4-13).  
  
                                                 
4
 For examples and in-depth discussion of how these tasks have been carried out in specific contexts, see Paris 
and Sisk (2009), Newman et al. (2009), Berdal and Economides (2007) and Durch (2006), amongst others. 
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The United Nations approach to peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau 
Although this section does not intend to provide an exhaustive analysis of the subject, it 
should be stressed that the armed conflict initiated in June 1998 in Guinea-Bissau was the 
consequence of a complex web of internal, regional and international factors. Among the 
structural causes of the conflict, one finds the Portuguese colonial legacy, which left 
profound marks on the economic, social and political structures, as well as on the 
infrastructure of the country. Secondly, the war of independence (1963-1974) left a surplus 
of weapons in the country that was later used by individuals in the armed forces and in the 
government to illegally supply separatist armed groups in Senegal. Finally, in the post-
independence period, the long-lasting rule of the African Party for the Independence of 
Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) contributed significantly to consolidate an autocratic and 
corrupt state apparatus strongly personified in the figure of João Ber ardo Ni o  Vieira, 
who remained in power between 1980 and 1998. This tangled web of factors, intertwined 
with the political and diplomatic interests of the former colonial powers in the region 
(Portugal, France and the Netherlands), created the general context for the armed conflict of 




According to Adebajo (2002: 111), the immediate causes of the armed conflict in 1998 lay 
in the deteriorating relations between Nino Vieira and the head of the Armed Forces, 
General Ansumane Mane. Both accused each other of involvement with the Casamance 
separatist movement in Senegal, and of responsibilities in the smuggling of arms to this 
country. Upon Vieira s decision to replace Mane as head of the Armed Forces, the latter 
initiated a military campaign that eventually led to the establishment of a military junta 
following the fall of Nino Vieira (who had also come to power via a coup d état) in May 1999. 
Between the replacement of Mane and the downfall of Nino Vieira, the armed confrontation 
in the country caused hundreds of deaths and a large number of internally displaced persons 
and refugees in neighbouring countries (ibidem: 126), in addition to bringing the national 
economy to a virtual standstill (Rudebeck, 2001: 12).  
                                                 
5
 For a more detailed exploration of the causes of the conflict, see ICG (2008), Ferreira (2004), MacQueen 
(2003), Forrest (2002), Adebajo (2002: 111-136), Rudebeck (2001) and Ostheimer (2001). On the responses of 
other international actors to the conflict, in particular the ECOWAS and the Portuguese-speaking countries, see 
the previously cited works by MacQueen and Adebajo, as well as Kabia (2009: 137-142), Obi (2009) and Roque 
(2009). On the more recent involvement of the European Union, see Gibert (2009). 
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The first multilateral responses to the armed conflict came from the ECOWAS and the 
Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP), who succeeded in brokering a peace 
agreement between Nino Vieira and Mane, which was signed in Abuja (Nigeria) in August 
1998. Under the terms of the agreement, Nino Vieira and Mane reaffirmed the ceasefire 
arranged a few days before and agreed to the complete withdrawal of all foreign military 
forces from the country, as well as to hold general and presidential elections by March 1999 
(S/1998/1028). The agreement also envisaged the deployment of an ECOWAS interposition 
force, supplied by its Monitoring Group (the ECOMOG, Economic Community of West 
African States Monitoring Group). It should be emphasised that this force was not led by the 
UN, but by a sub-regional organisation, and that it would only later be endorsed by the UN 
Security Council (S/RES/1216). I  Ade ajo s assess e t, the result of the ECOMOG efforts 
would prove to be limited due to its premature withdrawal after ECOWAS observed a 
significant deterioration in the security situation, as well as to the logistic and financial 
difficulties faced by the Group (Adebajo, 2002: 119-124). 
The United Nations only began to play a more significant role in the peace process after 
the signing of the Abuja agreement. Through staff at the Department of Political Affairs 
(DPA), the UN became involved in political initiatives in Bissau with the aim of ensuring and 
maintaining the ceasefire and guaranteeing the consolidation of the fragile peace  that had 
begun to emerge in the country.
6
 One of such initiatives was the establishment of the United 
Nations Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS), in March 1999.
7
 This model of 
political presence replicated the format of the United Nations Office in Liberia (UNOL), 
established in 1997 as part of the exit strategy of ECOMOG and of a UN observer mission in 
this country (DPA and UNDP, 2001: 9). The primary function of UNOGBIS, according to its 
original mandate, was to help create an an enabling environment for restoring and 
consolidating peace, democracy and the rule of law and for the organization of free and 
transparent elections,  in addition to facilitating implementation of the Abuja agreement 
(S/1999/232: 1). In New York, the presence of allied countries in the Security Council 
                                                 
6
 Interview with senior official of the UN Department of Political Affairs, New York, 16.11.2010. 
7
Not to be confused with the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO). Offices such as UNOGBIS are established in 
the field, usually have a mandate defined by the Security Council and normally operate under the aegis of the 
DPA. The PBSO, a New York-based Secretariat organ, was established in 2006 and is governed by its own terms 
of reference. 
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(namely France, Gambia and Portugal) ensured the continued interest of this body and of 
the UN in Guinea-Bissau (Adebajo, 2002: 119). 
Notwithstanding the unstable environment and the fragility of the actual agreement 
mediated by the ECOWAS, which became evident after the fall of Nino Vieira in May, the 
role of the UN in providing support for the holding of parliamentary and presidential 
elections was of great importance. Through the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP , the UN pro ided te h i al support for the atio al authorities duri g arious 
stages  of the ele toral pro ess, i ludi g, for instance, the preparation of the operational 
plan for training election officials (ibidem: 127-128). United Nations documents reveal that 
the UNDP supported the registration of over half a million voters, in addition to having 
initiated a massive civic education campaign to inform and educate the electorate on the 
electoral process  S/1999/1276: paragraph. 16). UNOGBIS, in turn, organised election 
debates amongst the candidates and coordinated the election observation efforts (ibidem: 
par. 17-19). Subsequent reports from the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-
Bissau and the work of UNOGBIS point out the active role of the United Nations in various 
areas during the period following the elections. UNOGBIS, for instance, offered its good 
offices in negotiations aimed at redefining the future role of the military in the democratic 
period (S/2000/250: par. 7), and carried out specific activities in what concerns the training 
of legislative and judiciary staff (S/2001/622: par. 24). 
In addition to its presence and efforts in the field, mainly via UNOGBIS, concerted 
diplomatic efforts towards peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau were carried out in New York 
from 2002 onwards. These efforts intensified following the creation of the so-called Ad Hoc 
Advisory Group for Guinea-Bissau, established under the aegis of the Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC). This group, which had a similar structure and functions to the one 
previously established for Haiti, was created in the context of broader institutional initiatives 
aimed at strengthening the links between peace and security and development issues in UN 
peacebuilding efforts (Prantl, 2006). In fact, despite some existing awareness of the 
interrelationship between peace and security and development,
8
 responsibilities over those 
                                                 
8
 On the relationship between peace, security and development, see in particular Mac Ginty and Williams 
(2009), Tschirgi et al. (2010) and Collier et al. (2003). At the time the ad hoc groups were active, Collier and his 
tea  esti ated that at the e d of a i il ar the t pi al ou tr  had a % ha e of retur i g to a situation 
of armed conflict within five years (Collier et al. 2003: 83). Despite future revisions and harsh methodological 
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issues remained, from an institutional perspective, clearly divided between the Security 
Council and the ECOSOC, respectively (ibidem: 9). 
The Guinea-Bissau Group was composed of five Permanent Representatives from 
Member States of the United Nations (South Africa, Brazil, the Netherlands and Portugal, in 
addition to Guinea-Bissau itself), and sought to e a i e [the ou tr s] humanitarian and 
economic needs, and review relevant programmes of support and prepare 
recommendations for a long-term programme of support,  as well as to pro ide ad i e o  
how to ensure that the assistance of the international community was adequate, coherent, 
ell oordi ated a d effe ti e a d pro oted s erg  De ision 2002/304, cited in Prantl, 
2006: 151). According to a diplomat with responsibilities related to the Group at the time, by 
supporting long-term activities outside the strict area of security, the diplomatic efforts 
undertaken within the ECOSOC sought precisely to bring the development sphere closer to 
the dimensions of peace, security and stability.
9
 In practice, the Group s ork was meant to 
serve as a platform for coordinating the efforts undertaken in the country by agencies and 
programmes within the UN system. A set of short- and long-term recommendations was 
therefore drawn up with the aim of interconnecting the peacebuilding efforts of the various 
entities within the UN system working in Guinea-Bissau.
10
 It should be noted, however, that 
the recommendations of the Group, due to its very nature, were not binding.  
According to Prantl (2006), who conducted an external assessment commissioned by the 
ECOSOC, the most important function of the Council s ad hoc groups was to lobby in favour 
of countries that normally have no easy access to the frontline of international financial aid. 
The Guinea-Bissau Group thus aimed to serve as a link between national authorities and 
international partners. In this sense, whilst the government would actively promote policy 
goals such as the implementation of the rule of law and political stability, international 
donors would provide the funding for emergency support and technical assistance in a wide 
range of fields  Pra tl, : .  
                                                                                                                                                        
criticisms, this estimate gained widespread acceptance amongst political decision-makers in New York, and was 
rhetorically used as a justification for the creation of the PBC in 2005, as Suhrke and Samset argue (2007). 
9
 Interview with senior diplomat from a Member State of the PBC Specific Configuration for Guineau-Bissau, 
New York, 17.12. 2010. 
10
 Documents relating to the Ad Hoc Advisory Group for Guinea-Bissau, including recommendations and activity 
reports, are available at https://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/adhocmech/bissau.shtml (last consulted on 
05.02.2013). 
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The ECOSOC terminated the mandate of its Ad Hoc Group for Guinea-Bissau in July 2008, 
following the inclusion of the country in the agenda of the then recently established 
Peacebuilding Commission (E/RES/2008/30). In December 2007, the Security Council had 
submitted to the Commission a request for advice on the situation in the country in the 
following areas: government capacity in the areas of finance, security sector reform and 
anticorruption measures; previous measures aimed at developing and strengthening the 
security system, the judiciary and the rule of law; the development of democratic practices 
and preparations for the holding of elections in the following year (S/2007/744). Following 
the PBC s acceptance of the request, the Co issio s so-called Specific Configuration for 
Guinea-Bissau would became the main intergovernmental locus for the discussion of issues 
related to peacebuilding efforts in the country. 
Within the context of the Configuration, the most concrete peacebuilding efforts took the 
form of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau, adopted in October 
2008 (PBC/3/GNB/3). The document was produced on the basis of a consultation process 
involving members of the CSC-Guinea-Bissau, UN staff and Bissau-Guinean authorities during 
several months.
11
 These efforts included, for example, a joint visit from the Chair of the CSC-
Guinea-Bissau and UN staff to the country in January 2008 (PBC/2/GNB/6), as well as visits 
from CSC delegations in April and June of the same year. In New York, informal thematic 
sessions took place with the aim of discussing issues that were potentially a priority for 
peacebuilding in the country (e.g. drug trafficking). Finally, the Secretariat drew up a map of 
existing resources and main gaps for peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau (PBC/2/GNB/7).  
In addition to diplomatic coordination efforts undertaken within the framework of the 
Commission, the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) was used to support the implementation of small 
projects with potential catalytic effect on peacebuilding in the country. Financial support 
from the Fund was initially planned in two stages. The first phase had a political purpose and 
was essentially destined to demonstrate support for the peacebuilding process in the 
country. It was expected that the implementation of projects in this phase would also serve 
to identify opportunities for greater PBF support in the future.
12
 In this context, the Fund 
allocated six million dollars to Guinea-Bissau in April 2008. According to a member of the 
                                                 
11
 Interview with member of the Peacebuilding Support Office staff, New York, 15.11.2010. 
12
 Interview with senior diplomat from a Member State of the PBC Specific Configuration for Guinea-Bissau, 
New York, 17.12.2010. 
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PBSO staff at the time, this sum reflected the assessment that the country lacked the 
capacity to absorb a higher amount.
13
 The second e elope , according to UN jargon, was 
only approved in January 2011 due to a series of delays in drawing up the priority plan for 
Guinea-Bissau. The sum total of this last envelope was 16.8 million dollars.
14
  
The PBF net financial contribution to peacebuilding projects in Guinea-Bissau up to 
December 2012 was approximately 23.8 million dollars.
15
 To put this figure into context, it 
should be emphasised that the estimate for resources required to ensure the functioning of 
UNIOGBIS (the revised version of the UNOGBIS; see below), was 19.9 million dollars for the 
year 2013 alone (A/67/346/Add.3: Table 1). It should also be noted that the PBF amount 
destined for Guinea-Bissau is the lowest of all the countries currently on the PBC agenda, 
representing only 7% of the net total disbursed by the Fund (339.4 million USD) since it was 
launched in October 2006.
16
 In short, although at first sight the total value of the PBF 
financial contribution to Guinea-Bissau may appear significant, it is less so when viewed from 
a broader perspective. 
More recently, with a view to incorporating systemic guidelines to foster greater 
integration and coherence in the activities undertaken by entities within the UN system, 
UNOGBIS was converted into the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-
Bissau (UNIOGBIS). As the focal point for UN activities in the country, the new Office has 
wider and more inclusive duties. More specifically, the primary function of the new Office is 
to assist the PBC in its activities towards Guinea-Bissau, in addition to providing support to 
the national government in various areas, including security sector reform and the 
strengthening of rule of law institutions (S/RES/1876:paragraph. 3).  
In short, since the conflict that devastated the country in 1998-1999, the United Nations 
approach to peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau has primarily focused on political and diplomatic 
initiatives involving relevant actors in New York and Bissau, principally via diplomatic forums 
and political offices in the field.  
                                                 
13
 Interview with former member of the Peacebuilding Support Office staff, via videoconferencing, 18.06.2012. 
14
 Interview with senior diplomat from a Member State of the PBC Specific Configuration for Guinea-Bissau, 
New York, 17.12.2010. 
15
 Unless otherwise stated, all figures referring to the PBF discussed in this article are presented as current USD 
values and were compiled by the author from data available on the UNDP Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office 
website (http://mptf.undp.org/). The data reflects current values as of 29.12.2012. 
16
 Compiled by the author from data available on the MPTF-UNDP website. See note 15. 
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The results of these efforts, however, have been limited. The elections held after the 
armed conflict were marked by serious endemic problems, including the inexperience of the 
opposition parties and the deterioration of the capacities and integrity of civil servants 
(Ostheimer, 2001: 47). The military continued to act as a kind of parallel power in the 
country, with Mane s i flue e o  the executive extending to the point of banning  a state 
visit by the Bissau-Guinean President to Senegal (ibidem: 48). In the months and years which 
followed, the Preside t s failure to promulgate the new constitution and the eventual 
dissolution of parliament would lead to a new coup d état carried out by the military in 
September 2003 (IRIN, 2003). From a socio-economic point of view, the ou tr s GDP per 
capita, measured at purchasing power parity, fell from 1,070 dollars in 1997, before the civil 
war, to 710 dollars in 2002 (UNDP, 2004: 187). These limitations, however, stemmed not 
only from problems related to the implementation and operationalization of specific 
policies, but also from the theoretical-political framework of the liberal peace that underlies 
the UN peacebuilding efforts in the country.  
 
Echoes of the liberal peace 
The influence of the liberal peace theoretical-political framework may be found in different 
aspects and at different levels of the UN peacebuilding efforts in Guinea-Bissau. In fact, an 
analysis of the overall lines of the UN approach to peacebuilding in the country after the 
1998 armed conflict reveals a strong emphasis on the promotion of values, norms and 
practices that reflect the projection of liberal states, particularly in what concerns their 
model of political (democracy) and socio-economic governance (market economies) (vide 
Newman et al., 2009: 11).  
The influence of liberal peace may be identified in different bodies. The mandates of the 
organs and entities appointed to deal with peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau, for example, do 
not fail to make clear connections between the importance ascribed to activities associated 
with promoting democracy and achieving peace, thus reflecting one of the key ideas of the 
liberal peace paradigm. The mandates of UNOGBIS, and later of UNIOGBIS, explicitly reflect 
this formulation, given that they refer to the need to create an enabling environment for 
restoring and consolidating peace, democracy and the rule of law and for the organization of 
free and transparent elections  “/ / , , or assume the need to strengthen the 
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capacities of national institutions in order to maintain constitutional order, public security 
and the full respect for the rule of law  “/‘E“/ , par. 3b).  
The mandate of the ECOSOC Advisory Group also refers to aspects of the liberal peace, 
particularly with regard to the link between market economies and the attainment of peace. 
In its Resolution 2005/2, for instance, the Group expressly recognises that the main 
challenges faced by Guinea-Bissau were to restore fiscal discipline [...] and improve the 
climate for private investment and economic diversification  E/‘E“/ / . In this passage, 
the connection between fiscal discipline  and climate for private investment  as 
challenges for the peacebuilding process in the country further reinforces the central 
premise that market democracies are a remedy  for the consequences of armed conflict, in 
line with formulations based on theorisations about the liberal peace.  
More recently, the efforts of the PBC CSC-Guinea-Bissau do not seem disconnected from 
the basic premises of the liberal peace. Its main instrument, the Strategic Framework for 
Peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau, identifies six priority areas: elections; measures to jump-
start the economy and rehabilitate infrastructure; security and defence sector reform; 
strengthening of the justice sector, consolidation of the rule of law and the fight against drug 
trafficking; the reform and modernisation of the public administration; and social issues 
relating to peacebuilding (PBC/3/GNB/3, 14-17). As previously mentioned, these areas reveal 
aspects of primary concern for the liberal peace paradigm, such as security sector reform 
and the rule of law.  
The existence of premises fundamental to the liberal peace framework within the 
mandates of UN bodies, as well as in their peacebuilding instruments and policies, is of 
crucial importance, since they are the entities that define the guidelines, priorities and 
objectives of the UN approach towards countries such as Guinea-Bissau. Consequently, the 
implementation and/or operationalisation of UN policies and projects in this area are 
necessarily shaped in light of the liberal peace framework. It is this framework that defines, 
for instance, the areas that may or may not be contemplated in specific actions, as well as 
those which will receive priority support.  
It is important to highlight that the policies and instruments guiding UN involvement are 
usually formulated with significant technical support from the Secretariat or traditional 
donors, frequently without the effective involvement of interlocutors representing the 
Bissau-Guinean society, which also illustrates a channel for the transmission of values and 
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practices associated with the liberal peace from the so-called i ter ational community  to 
countries such as Guinea-Bissau (Paris, 2002: 644). As discussed in the previous section, this 
transmission occurred not only during the drafting of the Strategic Framework, but also 
during the implementation of other efforts in the field, such as the holding of elections or 
the drafting of programmes aimed at restoring fiscal discipline in the country. Taken as a 
whole, such efforts may be seen as an attempt by the Commission to assume a significant 
role in defining and identifying peacebuilding priorities for the country.  
The impact of the liberal peace that underlies the United Nations peacebuilding practice 
becomes even clearer when the overall characteristics of PBF disbursements to Guinea-
Bissau are considered. The projects supported by the Fund in Guinea-Bissau may be divided 
into four thematic areas, in accordance with the PBF Terms of Reference (A/63/818: 5).
17
 
The majority of the projects (five) were classified under the heading of support to the 
implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue, with four of them having 
projected impacts on security sector reform in particular (see Table 1). As a whole, the four 
projects represent half (12 million dollars) of the total net amount transferred by the Fund to 
projects in Guinea-Bissau up to December 2012. These projects sought, amongst other 
objectives, to improve working conditions in military installations and hold a national 
conference on the defence and security sectors. On the other hand, one single project, 
budgeted at one million dollars, prioritised the promotion of sustainable livelihoods in 
Guinea-Bissau. Specifically, this project aimed to improve Bissau-Guinean o e s 
economic rights. Despite the significant amount, it should be noted that the project was 
approved within the context of the Immediate Response Facility (IRF), a PBF financing 
mechanism that supports projects, not programmes (see A/63/818: 6); in other words, this 
specific project was not necessarily drawn up in accordance with the long-term plans 




                                                 
17
 Interview with staff member of the Peacebuilding Support Office, 09.10.2012. 
18
 All data compiled from information available on the MPTF-UNDP website (http://mptf.undp.org/). 
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Table 1: Distribution of PBF funding in Guinea-Bissau 








1. Support for the implementation of peace agreements and 
political dialogue 
5 42 12.9 54 
1.1. Security sector Reform (SSR) 4 33 12 50 
1.2. Rule of law 1 9 0.9 4 
1.3. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration - - - - 
1.4. Enhancing political dialogue for peace agreements - - - - 
2. Promotion of coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflict 2 16 2.4 10 
2.1. National reconciliation 1 8 1.4 6 
2.2. Democratic governance 1 8 1 4 
2.3. Management of natural resources  - - - - 
3. Economic revitalisation and generation of immediate peace 
dividends  
3 25 7.5 32 
3.1. Creating short-term job opportunities 2 17 6.5 28 
3.2. Sustainable livelihoods 1 8 1 4 
4. (Re)establishing essential administrative services and related 
human and technical capacities 
2 17 1 4 
4.1. Public administration  2 17 1 4 
4.2. Provision of public services (including infrastructures) - - - - 
TOTAL 12 100 23.8 100 
 
Source: Data available on the MPTF Office website (http://mptf.undp.org/). The thematic areas reflect the 
Fu d s Terms of Reference (A/63/818) and the subcategories are in accordance with those used internally in 
the PBSO (information obtained from interviews with the Office staff). 
 
Significant echoes of the liberal peace paradigm can thus be detected in United Nations 
peacebuilding efforts in Guinea-Bissau. Although often implicit, these echoes may be 
identified in the mandates of organs and entities with specific responsibilities in the area of 
peacebuilding in the UN, where priorities and objectives are defined in the first place. 
Consequently, those echoes are also present in the implementation and format of 
programmes and projects carried out by the UN and other international actors in the field. 
 
Final considerations 
In spite of the involvement of the United Nations and the so-called i ter ational 
community  following the 1998-1999 armed conflict, Guinea-Bissau does not appear to have 
achieved the sustainable peace desired by those actors. In fact, the ou tr s socio-
economic development indicators remain very low, with some still at similar levels to 1997, 
prior to the outbreak of the civil war. Furthermore, political events such as failed coups 
d états in the early 2000s, the assassination of former President Nino Vieira in 2009 and the 
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recent military incursions into the political life of the country in April 2012 indicate that 
important political and institutional challenges still persist in Guinea-Bissau. In this sense, the 
situation in the country demonstrates the fragility and the limitations of the liberal peace 
paradigm that underlies the UN approach to peacebuilding in post-armed conflict situations.  
This article demonstrated that the United Nations approach to the peacebuilding process 
in Guinea-Bissau since the late 1990s has been heavily based on the theoretical-political 
framework of the liberal peace. It has identified the influence of this approach not only in 
the implementation phase of UN projects and activities in the field, but also during their 
design. The article argued that the limitations of UN peacebuilding are related not only to 
the implementation of specific policies, but also to their actual preparation and design, since 
the definition of guidelines, priorities and objectives already incorporates conceptions and 
worldviews that are subsequently transmitted vertically, from the top-down, in post-armed 
conflict situations. In this sense, any analysis of these processes needs to consider not only 
the implementation of concrete actions in the field, but also their implicit values.  
The analysis undertaken here not only confirms that the UN peacebuilding concept and 
practice in Guinea-Bissau have been influenced by the liberal peace, but also points to the 
persistence of this theoretical-political framework as the paradigm underlying the UN 
approach to the former Portuguese colony over the past fifteen years. In effect, despite 
some changes and innovations in UN efforts (e.g. the creation and redefinition of political 
offices in the field and institutional reforms in New York), the general approach to 
peacebuilding in the country is still excessively based on the promotion of markedly liberal 
values and practices, particularly through diplomatic support, the definition of priorities and 
support to areas deemed relevant for the construction of a liberal state that resembles the 
political systems in the Global North. In this sense, future reviews and approaches to UN 
peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau must also include more in-depth considerations that 
examine the compatibility and relevance of the liberal peace framework in that specific 
context. 
Translated by Sheena Caldwell 
Revised by the author and Teresa Tavares 
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